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Ethnonationalism in the Soviet Union: the Case
of the Baltic States

Luba Racanska
St. John's University
The bloody crackdown in Lithuania by the Soviet Air borne Troops ordered into that country and six other independenceminded Soviet Republics by President Mikhail Gorbachev
on January 7, 1991, shocked the Western world. The deployment
was necessary, according to a Defense Ministry announcement, to
enforce conscription regulations in the troubled areas, where turnout for the fall 1990 military draft has been especially low. 1 Yet
Gorbachev's decision to send the paratroopers into Lithuania
appears to be dictated more by political developments in the Baltic
republics rather than the officially stated defense considerations.
For Gorbachev, who is fighting a desperate battle to save the
internal empire and the political structure upon which his own
power rests, the conscription issue appears to provide a conven ient excuse to bring the most defiant republics into line.
Among all troubled union republics, popular support for
national sovereignty has been strongest in Lithuania and the other
two Baltic republics of Latvia and Estonia, where the opposition
to conscription has been only one part of their broad assertion to
autonomy. In the era of ~lasnost and perestroika, draft dodging
has become a political act supported by local parliaments, governments and pro-independence movements. The growth of nationalist sentiments among Russians and non-Russians and the escalation of demands in the Baltic republics has weakened Gorbachev 's
position within the Soviet leadership by fermenting instability and
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complicating his consolidation process. The latest assertion of
Moscow's authority in Lithuania and Latvia in January 1991
military crackdown only underlines the dwindling support enjoyed by the national government and the leadership's determination to save the union at any cost, including a serious set-back in
East-West relations. Gorbachev is willing to pay the price because
the survival of the union is closely related to his continued tenure
in power and the success of his Perestroika policy.
The ~ Qf Ethnonationalism
The source of this latest rise of ethnonationalism in the
Soviet Union can, ironically, be found in the Gorbachev's "revolution from above"-the blueprint for economic restructuring of
the Soviet Union known as perestroika, coupled with ~lasnost or
openness in the Soviet society-that encouraged the airing in
public of pressing questions in all union republics. The result of
these policies was an unintended rise of nationalist and ethnic
demands in the Baltic republics. In a country whose ideology long
enforced silence about national discontent, Gorbachev's policies
of decentralization and greater freedom to speak had immediate
implications for general nationality policy. In the Baltic republics
of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia especially, ~lasnost resulted in
less reticence to discuss underlying political, social and economic
problems. The attempts at economic decentralization since 1985,
accompanied by relaxed censorship at all levels, encouraged by
the end of the 1980s the emergence of openly vocal national
movements in all fifteen Union Republics whose demands vary
from greater autonomy to frank demands of secession. 2
This vocal and widespread resurgence of ethnic nationalism in the Soviet Union during the leadership of Mikhail Gor bachev has become, in the words of Arkady I. Vol sky, who was
sent to preside over the shaky peace in the embattled Azerbaijani
territory of Nagorno-Karabak3, the national curse because the
feeling of ethnic belonging has never been supplanted by a
broader sense of Soviet citizenship. Leonid Brezhnev's official
pronouncements of the 1970s announcing the emergence of a new
Soviet socialist nation populated by Soviet people forged from the
"ethnic mosaic" of the old Russian Empire sounds hollow in the
aftermath of the escalating nationalist demands by the ethnic
minorities since the late 1980s. 4 Even if such "ethnic mosaic" of
national minorities were truly possible, President Gorbachev now
faces an array of problems-ranging from mass migrations and
conflict along the nation's southern border, to Popular Front
movements in critical areas like the Ukraine, to the demands for
greater autonomy and push for independence in Latvia, Lithuania

110

and Estonia.
For Gorbachev, the increasing! y assertive ethnic nationalism among the non-Russian minorities of the USSR has emerged
as the major conflict area in Soviet domestic politics. The Party's
Draft Platform on Nationalities Policy of August 1989 acknowl edged that the nationalities question in the Soviet Union has
become exceptionally acute and suggested that a solution to the
problems that have arisen in this connection is of enormous
importance for the fate of restructuring and the future of the
country. 5 Besides placing Perestroika in jeopardy, the peripheral,
border location of the vocal ethnic groups make national identity
a military and security issue that has the potential to undermine the
improved East-West relations orchestrated by Gorbachev. The
ethnic unrest poses a threat not only to the cohesiveness of the
Soviet Union - a threat in itself to the international stability-but
also to the carefully nurtured image of Mr. Gorbachev in the West
as a reformer of the Soviet system. The swift military action in
Lithuania on January 13, 1991, where fifteen persons were killed
by Soviet Army tanks, has already damaged Gorbachev's image
of a reformer as indicated by the suspension and slowdown of
badly needed aid to Moscow by several Western governments. 6
The adaptation of the policy by the Western governments occurred despite Mr. Gorbachev's denial that the confrontations in
the Baltic states marked any change in his policies or his abandonment of the reforn1ist course he announced five years ago.
Ethnonationalism in the Baltic Republics
The most serious challenge to the cohesiveness of the
Soviet Union comes from the national movements in the Baltic
republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. In all three republics,
popular front movements with commanding public support have
pressed for greater economic and political independence, including the option of secession if their craving for sovereignty cannot
be satisfied within the present Soviet federation. Under
Gorbachev's policy of ~lasnost. controversy surrounding ethnic
politics has assumed numerous forms and has been given an
astounding degree of legitimacy. Protests, strikes, work stoppages, demonstrations and the like have become an almost "normal" part of the political process in the Baltic states. 7 Once -this
process was legitimized through public discussion, Gorbachev
and his colleagues could not claim a monopoly on agenda-setting,
especially in areas dealing with inter-ethnic issues.
The early catalyst for Baltic activism and rising nationalism was the concern for the environment. With Gorbachev's
encouragement to seek solutions to the environmental problems
111

present in the Soviet society, especially after the 1986 Chernobyl
nuclear reactor accident in the Ukraine, the Bal tic activists quickly
seized the opportunity to speak out about the intolerable environmental conditions present in the theirrepublics. The blame for the
environmental degradation was laid at the steps of the centralized
Stalinist drive of rapid industrialization that failed to adequately
assess the damaging environmental consequences of mammoth
factory projects, mines or energy-generating plants in the Baltic.
Besides the environmental concerns, the rapid industrialization also resulted in a large influx of non-Baltic ethnic groups
as workers into Latvia and Estonia and to a lesser degree, Lithuania. The fear of becoming an ethnic minority in their own
republic fuels the Baltic activism and nationalism that now
spearheads the drive for national independence and secession
from the Soviet Union. Of the three Baltic republics, the ethnic
composition is the most critical in Latvia where only 54 percent
of the total population of 2.7 million is Latvian. In Estonia the
situation is similar as 65 percent of the 1.6 million population is
Estonian. On the other hand, Lithuanians enjoy 80 percent majority in their state of 3.7 million. In all three republics the national
movements that quickly formed by 1988 under Gorbachev's
reform-minded leadership, mobilized peoples toward a recovery
of the past, the end of demographic and linguistic Russification,
a struggle against environmental pollution, greater local autonomy, republic-level self-financing, and real democracy. 8
In all three instances, environmental activists in the Baltic
republics first acted in an effort to gain control over their own
environment, resources and economy. In Latvia, it was the Environmental Protection Club, known by its Latvian initial V AK, that
criticized in 1986 the construction of a massive hydroelectric
station in the town of Daugavpils. The hotly debated project by
Latvian activists in the biweekly journal Literatura lill Maksla
caused the USSR State Planning Committee to mandate an expert
assessment of the project which, in January 1987 found it economically unsound and halted the construction in November
1987.
In Lithuania, ecological concerns also became the center
of sharp focus by the Movement to Support Perestroika (Sajudis)
after the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in northeastern Lithuania
caught fire on September 5, 1988. By October, Sajudis protests
led to a halt in a construction of a third planned reactor block.
Estonia as well initiated an environmental movement in 1986 over
the phosphorate mining conditions outside of Tallinn that evolved
into a democratic movement demanding, among other things,
economic autonomy and the supremacy of Estonian law over all112

union rule in cultural and political spheres. The ecologically
motivated Baltic movements scored early important victories that
led to political demands .
Fortified by their success in the environmental movement,
the Baltic activists now enlarged their demands for regional
autonomy to include political issues. In their fight to reclaim
national sovereignty, the symbols of independent Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia became a powerful inspiration for the Baltic
national movements as they actively pressed their demands for
greater autonomy. The Baltic drive for independence is also
fueled by the fact of their interwar independence that still remains
a living memory to many of their citizens. 9 An important goal of
the first phase of the national movements was to gain official
status for the flags and anthems of the interwar independent Baltic
states. By the end of 1988, the communist authorities in the Baltic
states granted official status to the flags of independent interwar
Baltic republics. By the fall of 1990, hundreds of these flags were
carried by demonstrators during mass rallies and protests.
The success of this initial campaign, valued more for it
symbolic rather than actual substantive value, moved the Baltic
people to press on with their demand for the publication of the
secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact propelled now
by broadly -based movements known as popular fronts. The facts
surrounding the claimed forced incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into the Soviet Union during the war and
especially the public airing of the secret protocol concluded
between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany became an early key
demand of Baltic activists.
Until the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on
August 23, 1939 sealed their fate, the three Baltic republics
enjoyed relative prosperity and independence. The pact's secret
"additional protocol" assigned Estonia and Latvia to the Soviet
sphere of influence , while Lithuania was left initially to Germany.
After the collapse of Poland most of Lithuania was placed into the
Soviet sphere of influence as well. After the international order in
Europe collapsed, all three republics, operating under heavy
Soviet influence guaranteed by the presence of the Red Army,
presented their application for membership in the USSR on July
21, 1940 in Moscow.
Despite the stem warnings from Moscow, the Lithuanian
legislature voted on September 24, 1989 to declare the 1940
Soviet annexation of the republic invalid, thus supplying what
could ultimately become the legal basis for secession. The vote in
1940 to join the Soviet Union, the legislature said, was not only
involuntary but improper because such questions must be submit-
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ted to a popular referendum. 10" After many denials the Soviet
Foreign Ministry finally acknowledged on February 27, 1990 that
it had found copies of a secret Soviet-Nazi agreement that allotted
parts of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. Yestnik, a new
magazine published by the Foreign Ministry, showed photographs of a typewritten Russian-language copy of the "Secret
Additional Protocol." 11
The success of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian
popular fronts which have only been in formal existence since
October 1988 has inspired the formation of similar groups inside
the Soviet Union, with activists from various republics coming to
the Baltic popular fronts to learn tactics and structure. In 1988 and
1989, the Baltic states offered a safe haven, political advice, and
logistical support to movements from other republics still harassed and persecuted by their authorities. The inability of the
central government to prevent "spillover" from the Baltic republics resulted in declaration of sovereignty or independence by
almost all fifteen Union Republics.
It was this spreading of yearning for independence from
the Baltic to other union republic that has awakened foreboding
and agitation in the Kremlin. The Baltic movements, which
dispute the legitimacy of Soviet power in their republics and
demand the right to decide whether they will remain within the
Soviet federation 12, created tensions within the Kremlin leadership and prompted Mr. Ligachev to issue a warning in September
1989 that if the ethnic discord continues, "the disintegration of the
Union of the Soviet Republics is inevitable." 13 Mr. Gorbachev
also warned Lithuanian activists that he does not plan to be
remembered as the Soviet leader who lost the Baltic and attacked
the ethnic unrest as an attempt to endanger his proposed program
of perestroika. While addressing a special meeting of the Communist Party's Central Committee on September 20, 1989, Gorbachev called the talk of secession, in particular the well-organized autonomy movements in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, as
"an irresponsible game" that not only interfered with his reform
plans, but also could lead to a civil war.
Lithuania became the first of the three Baltic states to
challenge formally the legitimacy of Soviet rule, but Estonia and
Latvia were not far behind. On December 10, 1989 Lithuania
became the first Soviet republic to abolish the Communist Party's
guaranteed monopoly on power when its parliament voted to
legalize rival political parties. In February 1990, in the Soviet
Union's first free multi party election in seven decades, the Soviet
Communist Party was overwhelmingly rebuffed by voters. The
loyalists of President Mikhail S. Gorbachev's Communist Party
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won only 7 of the 90 seats filled by voters-all managed among
the republic's non-Lithuanian minority. The election results, from
a turnout estimated at more than 70 percent of eligible voters, was
the most forceful demonstration so far of the prevailing view of
the Lithuanian people that the Soviet Union has never held
legitimate authority over the republic since it was annexed in
1940. The plan of the pro-independence Sajudis strategists was
then to use their new parliamentary majority to name a new
president, Vytautas Landsbergis, and formally declare political
independence by calling an immediate end to the Communist
Party's vast patronage monopoly over Lithuania's institutional
life. After that, Lithuanian leaders hoped to negotiate with President Gorbachev and the Central Government on the details of a
complete break. The official declaration of independence was
announced on March 11, 1990.
The boldness of the Baltic national movement caught
Moscow by surprise. Reacting to the fast-pace developments in
Vilnius, the Soviet authorities sent a column of tanks and paratroopers rumbling past an all-night session of the Lithuanian
Parliament early on March 24, 1990 in what witnesses described
as the strongest attempt yet to intimidate the republic into abandoning its declaration of independence announced on March 11.
Dismissing the republic's declaration of independence as illicit,
Gorbachev justified the troop movements as "part of the national
Government's duty to preserve law in what remains a Soviet
republic." Self-determination, he urged, "is an issue to be settled
by mutual agreement under pending constitutional provisions. "14
As they are being shaped by Gorbachev officials, however, these
provisions threaten to add years of political hurdles to Lithuania's
course.
Estonia has been charting its own, more cautious approach
to independence, a slower pace that legislators deny is related to
Mr. Gorbachev's pressure on Lithuania. Gorbachev asked Estonians to retract its initial move toward an independence resolution, approved on March 31, 1990, in which the Soviet Union was
accused of illegally occupying the republic for the last 50 years.
Concerned about the "domino" theory, President Gorbachev
warned against Estonia's following Lithuania in declaring independence. In a telephone call to President Arnold F. Ruutel from
the Kremlin on April 3, 1990, theSovietleaderexpressedconcem
that the Baltic republics' rebellion be contained. In contrast to the
Lithuanian declaration, the Estonian sovereignty resolution approved in Tallinn was not a full declaration of independence, but
rather a notice to Moscow that the republic has started on a gradual
course of reclaiming independent statehood lost in the forced
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Soviet annexation of 1940.
After initial tough talk on Lithuania, the White House
softened its tone, making it clear that the United States was not
prepared to take the Baltic republic's side in its test of wills with
Moscow. Western European leaders, concerned about wider
repercussions of the Baltic crisis, also neither encouraged nor
rejected Lithuania's claim to independence. They avoided any
direct criticism of the Soviet Army's reported violent roundup of
Lithuanian deserters in Vilnius. Washington instead called for
negotiations between Lithuania and Moscow and said "any other
resolution runs the risk of being counterproductive" for SovietAmerican relations. During the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister
Eduard A. Shevardnadze on April 4, 1990 in Washington, Secretary of State James A. Baker cautioned that a crackdown in
Lithuania could wipe out much of the progress made in SovietAmerican relations in the last year. 15
While the administration downplayed the Lithuanian issue in Soviet-American relations, Congress passed a delicately
phrased resolution, which has no legal force, for the President "to
plan for and take steps, at the earliest possible time, that would
normalize diplomatic relations with the new Government of
Lithuania." American policy is complicated by the fact that even
though the United States has never recognized Lithuania's incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940, it did sign the Helsinki
accords in the 1970s that accepted Europe's de facto borders in
exchange for human-rights concessions by the Soviet bloc. Unless dramatic events in the Soviet Union cause equally dramatic
reversal of U.S. foreign policy, the American administration's
policy continues to echo Mr. Gorbachev's sentiment that "it
would be sad and dangerous if an incorrect interpretation would
endanger what has been achieved in international relations in
recent years." 16
Even though the Baltic republics continued to press their
demands for independence during the second half of 1990, the
international scene, and the American administration, was dominated by the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. When the conscription issue in
Lithuanian heated up in October after the legislature proposed that
Moscow allow Lithuanian military recruits to do their mandatory
service in their homeland, the Kremlin responded that the Lithuanian republic isa part of the Soviet Union, which has a constitution
and a law on Universal Military Service. A political solution to the
draft question was attainable after Chief of Staff Mikhail Moiseyev
offered that 25 percent of all non-Russian draftees will be allowed
to serve in their home districts. 17 Nikolai Ryzhkov, during his
negotiations with Lithuanian President Landsbergis stressed
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Moscow's willingness to meet Lithuania halfway as long as basic
principles are not violated. Such basic principles were in question
when Defense Minister Dmitri T. Yazov vehemently condemned
any attempts to set up military regiments by the republic and
suggested that the aim of such units was armed resistance to
Moscow. 18 Moscow's resort to force, an instrument renounced by
Gorbachev during Eastern Europe's democratization process in
1989, sowed doubts in the West concerning Moscow's sincerity
and determination to continue its reform programs.
The crisis in the Baltic republics is due to the fact that the
national movements set the agenda to which Moscow only reacted
or not acted at all. Consequently, Gorbachev's program has
constantly been lagging behind the escalating demands of the
republics. Starting with a call for "the complete political and
economic decentralization" in June 1988, the Baltic activists
stepped up their demands for sovereignty and finally full independence by early 1990. Only after the Lithuanian and Estonian
parliaments devised plans for achieving full independence did the
Soviet leadership propose specific measures for reforming the
national-state structure. Kazimiera Prunskiene, prime minister of
Lithuania, told Gorbachev: "Imagine how skeptical we are of a
new Union whose plan we have not seen." 19
The continued demand for Baltic independence can result
in dramatic disintegration of the Soviet Union. In an interview in
the Soviet weekly Sobesednik, USSR People's Deputy Yurii
Afanasyev, a rector of the Moscow Historical-Archival Institute
who supports Baltic drive for sovereignty, predicted that the
Soviet Union will be transformed into a union of sovereign states.
According to him, the disintegration of the Soviet Union can now
be stopped only "by force," an act which would "delay for decades
the establishment of normal neighborly relations" between Russia
and the other republics. Similar! y, he argues, Gorbachev' s ploy of
attempting to hold the USSR together through the instrument of
the newly established "strong presidency" is also doomed: "The
idea of a democratic dictatorship is not destined to be realized." 20
Alexander Solzhenitsyn also offers vision of a Russian
future in his programmatic brochure, "How Shall We Reconstitute Russia?" published in two major Soviet newspapers. Solzhenitsyn says clearly that the Soviet Union has no future as a single
state. Centrifugal developments and separatist tendencies, he
argues, have advanced to a point where the union can be held
together only at the cost of enormous bloodshed. Russia, Solzhenitsyn contends, should herself take the initiative to disband an
empire that is sapping her strength and in fact killing her. 21 Most
Russian nationalists, however, insist on the preservation of the
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territorial integrity of the USSR. Organizations such as Nash
Sovremennik, Molodiya Gvardiya. or Moskva have suddenly
turned into supporters of "true federalism. " 22
American policy toward the Soviet Union is faced now
with a fundamentally important fact: The Soviet Union of the past
is ceasing to exist. What will replace the Union of the Soviet
Socialist Republic will have profound influence on the development of the people within the Union as well as on the development
of regional and international relations. The nationalist demands of
the Baltic states--political independence from the Soviet Union-strikes at the heart of American policy that aims to promote
democratic transformation of the Soviet Union at the same time as
giving unconditional support to Gorbachev and his policy of
perestroika.
While Gorbachev has been highly successful in convincing an international audience of the existence of a global community confronted with common problems and sharing all-human
values and interests, domestically, he has been unable to further
a sense of commonwealth and of a common future within a Soviet
federation. The Kremlin's inability to stop or at least slow down
the Baltic call for separatism pushed Gorbachev to his last-ditch
effort to keep the Soviet Union intact by calling for a national
referendum on the nation's future scheduled for March 17, 1991.
Regardless of its outcome, the future of the Soviet Union depends
more on a quick and equitable resolution of its systemic crisis.
As the political developments in the era of ~lasnost and
perestroika already indicate, a renewal of the federation system is
unlikely to satisfy all ethnic problems and demand and may
actually increase the nationalistic tendencies in the Baltic states
and other union republics. Moscow's continued inability to
resolve the national demands of the Baltic republics and other
ethnic groups in the Soviet Union within the framework of the
present federal structure and proposed economic restructuring
can lead not only to chaos and the disintegration of the Soviet
Union into its constituent republics, but also to deterioration in
East-West relations and resumption of international hostilities.

FOOTNOTES
1

According to the Defense Ministry, draft evasion figures released
for the fall 1990 conscription indicate turn-out rate of 12.5% in
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